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I. INTRODUCTION
Business news has started to sound like a Shakespearean tale - filled with
deception, theft, and greed. The rise and fall of major corporate power-
houses, such as Enron and WorldCom, have made phrases, like "pervasive
accounting violations" and "improper financial disclosure," part of everyday
conversations. Average investors lost not only fortunes, but also their faith
in Corporate America. They turned to Congress and cried out, "Corporate
governance!" In 2002, Congress responded with The Sarbanes-Oxey Act-
the most dramatic legislation of federal securities since the 1930s.
Sarbanes-Oxley radically redesigns the federal regulation of corporate
governance and reporting. Its purpose is to prevent future scandals and
restore investor confidence by creating the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, revising auditor independence rules and corporate
governance standards, expediting financial reporting, and increasing criminal
penalties for violations of securities laws. Sarbanes-Oxley has focused
corporate governance on the creation of an "adequate internal control
structure and procedures for financial reporting."
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In spite of completely overhauling the accounting and auditing
professions, some critics of Sarbanes-Oxley claim that the Act is ineffective
and does not prevent fraud. Sarbanes-Oxley merely adds to an already-long
laundry list of accounting and disclosure rules and perhaps ignores the root
cause of all of the scandals-human greed. A perfect example in Corporate
America of a tale of woe created by greed is Krispy Kreme Doughnuts.
At one time, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts was the example of corporate
glory. From its humble beginnings in Winston-Salem, North Carolina this
bakery grew into a nationwide retailer of doughnuts. Already a successful
stock on the public capital markets, Krispy Kreme became a phenomenon
when it positioned itself as a safe, straightforward business model in the wake
of the Enron accounting scandal. Unfortunately, Krispy Kreme became
addicted to this fame, and the company started to look for ways to report
exceptional growth even during business downturns. In 2004, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched an investigation into the
company's overly aggressive accounting policies that overstated earnings.
Then, Krispy Kreme's empire crumbled under shareholder, franchise, and
employee lawsuits and criminal charges, exposing its manipulation of
investors through improper accounting, misleading statements, and policies
of deception. Investors were shocked, as what should have been an icon for
success in marketing and stock performance became another calamity of
human greed.
The irony of Krispy Kreme's tragedy is that it is juxtaposed with the
corporate governance overhaul of Sarbanes-Oxley. Krispy Kreme may be an
extreme example of fraudulent accounting, but is not that what Sarbanes-
Oxley was supposed to prevent? Perhaps accounting legislation is not the
best method for preventing major corporate fraud. Perhaps fraud is not
merely violations of federal securities law, but, instead, manifestations of the
sins of a greedy corporate culture.
Part II of this article discusses the rise and fall of Krispy Kreme
positioned next to the accounting reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley. This section
also discusses the controversy surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms, as well
as major areas of business that Sarbanes-Oxley fails to address. Part III of
this article proposes alternatives for preventing accounting fraud. This
section discusses new roles for independent auditors and principles-based
accounting, as well as the creation of "ethics as a corporate asset." It uses
Krispy Kreme as an example of how accounting rules do not adequately
address the root of corporate scandal - human greed. This article proposes
that to overcome human greed, corporations should implement and enforce
internal ethics programs at all levels of the corporate hierarchy, restructure
rewards and compensation systems to remove the incentive for fraudulent
behavior, and require that top executives act as icons for corporate integrity.
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II. THE INGREDIENTS
A. Krispy Kreme-The Concept
Krispy Kreme is a leading retailer of premium doughnuts that sells close
to three billion doughnuts a year.' Krispy Kreme has over three hundred
fifty stores (both company-owned and franchises) in operation2 and almost
seven thousand employees.' Its customers go crazy over its Hot Original
Glazed Doughnut. Its stores feature a "doughnut theater," where customers
watch doughnuts being made.4
Outside of its retail stores, Krispy Kreme distributes its doughnuts
through multiple channels. For example, Krispy Kreme sells prepackaged
doughnuts in grocery and convenience stores and fresh doughnuts at
universities, industrial centers, and sports and entertainment venues.' It also
controls its Cost of Goods Sold with a vertically integrated supply chain,
which provides the doughnut mixes, production equipment, and coffee to
its stores, both company-owned and franchises.6
1. WALL STREET'S FAVORITE DOUGHNUT
In 1937, Krispy Kreme started selling its Hot Original Glazed Doughnuts
to customers on the sidewalk from a hole in a building in Winston-Salem,
North Carolina. By 1999, Krispy Kreme had coast-to-coast sales of nearly
$220.2 million, and was ready to become a major national retailer with the
help of the public financial markets.7 On April 5, 2000, Krispy Kreme
offered its common stockon NASDAQ under the ticker KREM, raising $63
million for three million shares ($21 per share9). Within three days, its stock
I CoRPoRATEFAcTSHEET (2006), athttp//phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c= 12 0929&p=
irol-pubfactsheet.
2 Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 31 (Nov. 9, 2006).
3 Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc.,Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 15 (April 16,2004) [hereinafter
2004 Annual Report].
4 CORPORATE OVERVIEW (2007), at http/phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix/zhtml?c= 12 0 9 2 9 &p=
irol-homeprofile.
5 2004 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 4.
6 Id. at5.
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price almost doubled," and, in September, it reached $103 per share."
Krispy Kreme was the second most successful IPO of 2000.12
On May 17, 2001, Krispy Kreme transferred its common stock from
NASDAQ to the New York Stock Exchange, changing its ticker to KKD. 3
The day before the transfer, Krispy Kreme reported that its first-quarter net
income rose 89% from the previous year.' 4  It closed its fiscal year in
February of 2002 with annual sales totaling $394.4 million" and a stock price
of $39.02 per share, following a two-for-one stock split in June, 2001.16
Krispy Kreme's stock performance had become even more famous than their
doughnuts!
During Krispy Kreme's 2002 fiscal year, the financial markets were
haunted by the terrorist attacks on September 1 1th and the aftermath of the
Enron bankruptcy scandal, which involved corporate abuse by Enron's
executives and accounting fraud related to "off-balance-sheet" investments.
Enron's demise sparked investor skepticism in the financial markets, major
restructuring within the Big Five accounting firms, and the strengthening of
the SEC's enforcement power.
17
Nervous investors turned to companies with straightforward business
models-like a simple American doughnut shop. Krispy Kreme capitalized
on its traditional, brick-and-mortar business structure and welcomed investors
weary from the technology bubble's explosion. However, in 2002, these
investors were surprised by Krispy Kreme's sudden announcement that the
company was abandoning an off-balance-sheet financing plan called a "synthetic
lease" in favor of a $35 million manufacturing and distribution center.' The
10 Id.
11 Amey Stone, How Far Have Net Stocks Fallen? The KREMEY Knows, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct.
20,2000, at http://www.businessweek.convbwdaily/dnflas/oct20O0/nf20001020_17.htm.
12 Id.
13 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Krispy Kreme Begins Trading Tomorrow on
the New York Stock Exchange; New Ticker Symbol is 'KKD' (May 16, 2001), at
http://www.krispykreme.coniinvestorrelations.html (follow"NEWS RELEASES" hyperlink; then follow
"2001 Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Krispy Kreme Begins Trading Tomorrow on the New York
Stock Exchange; New Ticker Symbol is 'KKD'" hyperlink).
14 Davide Dukcevich, Winner of the Week: Krispy Kieme, FORBES.CoM, May 18, 2001, at
http://www.forbes.com/2001/05/18/0518krispy.html.
15 2004 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 23.
16 CNNMoney.com, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc. Historical Stock Quote from Feb. 1, 2002,
at http://money.cnn.com/quote/historical/historica.html?shownav=true&pg=hi&closedate=
2%2F1%2F2002&symb=KKD&time'=2mo (last visited March 2,2007).
17 See Editorial, The Wrath of the Investor Class, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 25, 2002, at
http://www.businessweekcom/magazine/content/02_08/b3771134.htm.
is Ari Weinberg, Krispy Kreme Changes Its Plant Financing, FoRBEs.CoM, Feb. 12, 2002, at
http.'/www.forbes.com/2002/02/12/0212synthetic.html.
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company decided to leverage the project with more traditional, on-balance-sheet
debt. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Scott A. Livengood, eased investors'
concerns by stating that "[i]n the current economic climate, investors
understandably are paying closer attention to the financial strength of their
companies. There is no reason for us to do anything that could be
misinterpreted, regardless of how legal and acceptable it may be." '9 In addition
to its debt restructuring, Krispy Kreme announced that, in the interests of
candor, it would accelerate its disclosures of proposed stock sales by its senior
executives. 20
Furthermore, Livengood emphasized the company's strong sense ofvalues:
Having a set of both brand values and internal cultural values, which is
clearly expressed and widely communicated, has been and remains a
key priority. As part of that effort [to become a global company] we
must make sure we are transparent about our governance, our values,
and our aspirations to all our constituencies.2
Krispy Kreme hoped that its candor would reestablish investor confidence;
which it did. It was credited with the most creative response to an investment
environment tainted by September 11th and corporate scandal.2
In its 2003 fiscal year, Krispy Kreme continued to capitalize on investor
hunger for growth stocks in the context ofa general market decline. On August
19, 2003, Krispy Kreme shares closed at $49.20 per shareJ--a 235% increase
from its initial public offering price on NASDAQ because of its apparent
overwhelming success.2 Fortune Magazine called Krispy Kreme "the hottest
brand in the land."2'
19 Id.
2D Krispy Kreme Speeds Disclosure on Stock Sales, TRIANGLE Bus J., Mar. 26, 2002, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2002/03/25/dailyl9.html.
21 WILLIAM DUNK'S 2002 ANN. REP. ON ANN. REPORTS, LONG ON WORDS; SHORT ON IDEAS:
KRISPY HAS RIGHT RECIPE, GLOBAL PROVINCE, at http://www.globalprovince.com2002ar.htm (last
visited March 2,2007).
2 Id.
23 CNNMoney.com, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc. Historical Stock Quote from Aug. 19,2003,
at http://money.cnn.com/quote/historical/historical.html?shownav=true&pg= hi&closedate =
8%2F19%2F03&symb=KKD&time=5yr (last visited March 2, 2007).
24 Kate O'Sullivan, Kremed!, CFO MAGAZINE, June 1, 2005, available at
http;//www.cfo.con/printable/ article.cfm/4007436?f= options. Krispy Kreme's 2-for-I stock split on
June 14, 2001 is reflected in the return on the investment (ROI) from the IPO to August 19, 2003.
25 Id.
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2. IT's GETrING HOT IN THE KITCHEN
Despite Krispy Kreme's fanatical popularity with investors and consumers
alike, the company's fall from grace was fast and severe. On May 7, 2004,
Livengood shocked Wall Street with his announcement that expected diluted
earnings per share from continuing operations would be 10% lower than its
previously announced guidance.26 Krispy Kreme blamed an increasing
consumer interest in low-carbohydrate diets, which had been affecting demand
across all flour-based food categories.' Furthermore, Krispy Kreme announced
that it would divest its bread bakery division, Montana Mills, by closing a
majority of the bakeries and selling the remaining stores.28 This divestiture
would result in a non-cash pre-tax asset impairment charge of $34 million.
29
The company also began closing under-performing Krispy Kreme Doughnut
stores and its franchises began filing for bankruptcy.'
Krispy Kreme's troubles continued. On October 7, 2003, Krispy Kreme
announced that the SEC had begun a formal investigation into the company's
buyback of several of its doughnut franchises.3' Krispy Kreme denied any
improper practices. However, independent accounting experts speculated that
company executives used aggressive accounting to increase earnings from the
purchase of franchises.32 These buyouts created intangible assets, "reacquired
franchise rights," which Krispy Kreme did not amortize because it assigned the
assets indefinite lives.3a If the assets had been amortized," non-cash
amortization charges would have significantly reduced earnings. Krispy Kreme
also did not disclose that some of the sellers of the franchises included the
CEO's ex-wife, a chairman of the board, a former chief executive, and a non-
26 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., In Response to Recent Industry Dynamics,
Krispy Kreme Updates Business Outlook (May 7, 2004), at http://www.krispykreme.corn/investor
relations.html (follow "NEWS RELEASES" hyperlink; then follow "2004 Releases" hyperlink; then





31 Brian Louis, Stock in Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Drops on Inquiry News, Profit Warning, WINSTON-
SALEMJOURNAL, July 30, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 14528002.
32 Brian Louis, Krispy Kreme Under SEC Investigation for Franchisee-buying Strategy, WINSTON-
SALEMJOURNAL, August 17, 2004 available at 2004 WLNR 14528789.
33 Id.
34 Most companies that buy franchise markets do amortize "reacquired franchise rights."
Although Krispy Kreme's decision not to amortize this asset was the most aggressive approach, it was not
clearly a violation of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
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voting member of the board.3" The sellers' relationships with Krispy Kreme
were important, because investors suspected that the company significantly
overpaid for the franchises involved in the buyback program.36
3. Now THERE'S A FIRE
As Krispy Kreme's stock price plunged, its shareholders filed derivative
lawsuits against Krispy Kreme, its executives, and its independent audit firm,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (Pricewaterhouse.) The lawsuits alleged that
Krispy Kreme, its executives, and its auditors knew that sales were slowing long
before issuing a profit warning in May 2004 and that executives violated
securities laws by releasing false financial statements and by issuing false and
37misleading guidance about Krispy Kreme's revenue and earnings.
Additionally, the suits alleged that Pricewaterhouse turned a blind eye to the
violations "in order to retain Krispy Kreme as a client and to protect the fees it
received from Krispy Kreme."
38
Troubles extended beyond stock price-Krispy Kreme's average weekly
doughnut sales plunged as well, even as new stores opened.39 Franchisees
claimed that some stores were getting inflated shipments of corporate-supplied
raw materials in the final weeks of a quarter so that corporate would meet its
sales goals. 4° They also claimed that Krispy Kreme shipped high-margin
doughnut-making equipment to the stores, long before the stores wanted
it-the timing based solely on the corporate financial reporting schedule.
Finally, franchisees alleged that Krispy Kreme sold equipment to them, recorded
the sales on corporate financial statements, and then bought back the same
equipment.4'
In 2005, Krispy Kreme announced that it would restate its financial
statements for 2004 as the reported information was not reliable. 42 The
company estimated adjustments related to the franchise buybacks totaling
35 Louis, supra note 32.
36 Id.
37 Brian Louis, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc.'s Auditor Added as Defendant in Shareholder Lawsuit,
WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, February 23, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2781363.
38 Id.
39 O'Sullivan, supra note 24.
40 Id.
41 Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks, Krispy Kreme Probe Blasts Ex-Managers OverAccounting, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 11, 2005, at B13, available at 2005 WLNR 12635940.
42 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces Decision to Restate
Financial Statements (Jan. 4, 2005), at htrtp//www.krispykreme.cominvestorrelations.html (follow
"NEWS RELEASES" hyperlink; then follow "2005 Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Krispy Kreme
Announces Decision to Restate Financial Statements" hyperlink).
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between $6.2 and $8.2 million to pre-tax income for the previous fiscal year.43
However, the company could not file its past-due quarterly reports for 2005 or
its restated 2004 financial statements until it completed its own internal
investigation of these matters. 44 Then, Krispy Kreme replaced Livengood with
Stephen Cooper, a restructuring specialist, as interim CEO.aS
When Krispy Kreme seemed to have hit rock bottom, the company
announced that the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New
York had begun an investigation for criminal misconduct related to the matters
also under investigation by the SEC.' Then Krispy Kreme's employees filed a
lawsuit against the company's executives for withholding information, which
included mismanagement and risky, inappropriate accounting practices that
artificially inflated the company's stock, and that the executives' actions caused
the employees exorbitant losses in 401(k) accounts and profit-sharing plans
which held the company stock.47
In April of 2005, the company procured $225 million in new financing,
which it used to pay off approximately $100 million in outstanding debt, fees
and expenses related to its refinancing and restructuring, and provide cash for
operations. 4' At the same time, the company warned investors not to rely on its
published financials for fiscal years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and three quarters
43 Id.
44 Id. Krispy Kreme's failure to deliver its financial statements to its lenders by the deadlines
constituted a default of approximately $100 million in outstanding debt; however, its lenders waived the
right to terminate the credit facility. Id.
45 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces Management Changes
(Jan. 18, 2005), at http//www.lrispykreme.com/investorrelations.html (follow "NEWS RELEASES"
hyperlink; then follow "2005 Releases" hyperlink, then follow "Krispy Kreme Announces Management
Changes" hyperlink). Cooper was also the interim CEO, President and Chief Restructuring Officer of
Enron. Id.
46 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces Additional
Governmental Investigation (Feb. 24, 2005), at http://www.krispykreme.com/investorrelations.html
(follow "NEWS RELEASES" hyperlink; then follow "2005 Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Krispy
Kreme Announces Additional Governmental Investigation" hyperlink).
47 Brian Louis, Worker Sues Krispy Kreme Subsidiary over Mismanagement of Pension Plans,
WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 11, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 3770624; see also Richard M. Barron, Krispy
Kreme Lawsuit Targets Executives for 401(k) Losses, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Mar. 10, 2005, at
Al, available at 2005 WLNR 3754893. The employees allege over $4 million in losses for their 401(k)
accounts and almost $15 million in their profit-sharing plans. See Brian Louis, Worker Sues Krispy
Kreme Subsidiary over Mismanagement of Pension Plans, WINSTON-SALEMJ., Mar. 11, 2005, available
at 2005 WLNR 3770624.
48 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces $225 Million
Financing (Apr. 4, 2005), at http://www.krispykreme.com/investorrelations.html (follow "NEWS
RELEASES" hyperlink; then follow "2005 Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Krispy Kreme Announces
$225 Million Financing" hyperlink)
KRISPY KREME, SARBANES-OXLEY
of fiscal year 2005.49  Krispy Kreme finally started to file these financial
statements in April of 2006, after going well over a year without any disclosure."
Throughout 2006, Krispy Kreme continued its corporate overhaul in an effort
to turn the company around-hiring Daryl Brewster, an expert in the food
industry, as President and CEO: closing nearly 100 stores, settling numerous
lawsuits with employees, franchisees, and shareholders for millions of dollars;
and expanding into Asia and the Middle East."' Despite these efforts, Krispy
Kreme closed the 2006 calendar year with a stock price of $11.10.52
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
1. SARBANES-OXLEY MAKES A MESS
The details of this saga of corporate fraud and deception at Krispy Kreme
are appalling. However, Krispy Kreme's story is even more disturbing in the
context of the corporate governance movement after the Enron scandal. After
the Enron scandal and the subsequent dissolution of the accounting and
consulting firm, Arthur Anderson, investor skepticism led investment analysts
to uncover numerous other corporate accounting scandals in major U.S. firms,
such as WorldCom and Adelphia Communications.53 Congress thereafter
responded by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act onJuly 30,2002. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is the most significant federal securities legislation since the 1930s.
Its purpose is to target corporate corruption and restore investor trust in U.S.
corporations.' 4 The Act focuses on disclosure and risk management and the
auditing and reporting of financial information to investing communities and
the SEC.55
4 O'Sullivan, supra note 24.
50 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Krispy Kreme Files Form 10-K for the Fiscal
Year Ended January 30, 2005 (Apr. 28, 2006), at http://www.krispykreme.com/investorrelations.html
(follow "NEWS RELEASES" hyperlink; then follow "2006 Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Krispy
Kreme Files Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended January 30, 2005" hyperlink).
51 Howard W. Penney, Prudential Sweet Talks Krispy Kreme, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2006, at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/oct2006/pi20061027_411078.htm.
52 CNNMoney.com, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., Historical Stock Quote from Dec. 29, 2006,
at http://money.cnn.com/quote/historical/historical.html?pg=hi&close-date= 12%2F29%2F06&symb=
KKD&time= lmo (last visited March 2, 2007).
53 Dave Taylor, What is Sarbanes Oxley and Mlsy Does It Change Everything?,
ASKDAvETAYLOR.COM, at http://www.askdavetaylor.con/whatissarbanes oxleyandwhydoes it_
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The most significant provisions address financial reporting, corporate
accountability, and the role of the independent auditor. The reporting
provisions include expediting financial disclosures such as annual reports (from
90 to 60 days) and quarterly reports (from 45 to 35 days), accelerating
disclosures of trades by insiders (from 40 days to the second day following the
transaction), and mandating public disclosure of CEO and CFO compensation
and profits. 6
Requiring CEOs and CFOs to personally certify the accuracy of financial
statements has increased executive accountability, as the submission of false
statements carries with it a penalty of up to twenty years in jail. 7 In addition,
executives and directors are prohibited under Sarbanes-Oxley from obtaining
personal loans from their corporations. 8
The auditor provisions include a requirement of auditor independence and
a prohibition on auditing firms offering value-added, business-consulting
services. Public companies are also required to have an internal audit group,
which must be certified by external auditors. Furthermore, the Act established
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate auditing
practices.59
Although Sarbanes-Odey may seem to codify "obvious" requirements of
a safe investment community, its consequences reveal that investors probably
needed additional federal protections. In 2004, 414 public companies restated
their financial reports, up from 323 in 2003 and 330 in 2002 (the year of
enactment.)' The three most frequent causes of financial restatements were
revenue recognition (16.4% in 2004), equity accounting (16% in 2004), and
reserves, accruals, and contingencies (14.1% in 2004.)61 These restatements
reveal some level of effectiveness of Sarbanes-O&dey. Most importantly,
multiple-period restatements, like Krispy Kreme's reporting situation,
demonstrate that Sarbanes-Oxley can effectively point to extremely flawed
internal controls and overly aggressive accounting policies. 
6
56 Jonathan Schwartz, Sarbanes OxleyAct: A Matter of Trust, PARALLAX ONLINE-THEJOURNAL





60 Len Boselovic, Accounting Miscues Becoming More Common in Corporate America,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE,Jan. 24, 2005, at B1, available at 2005 WLNR 969490.
61 Taylor, supra note 53.
62 Boselovic, supra note 60. However, Krispy Kreme did not restate its financials simply because
of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Krispy Kreme's restatements were a result of the SEC's formal
investigation of violations of Sarbanes-Oxley and numerous lawsuits by investors, employees, and
franchises.
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In spite of the numerous restated financial reports, many critics of the Act
have argued that it has the potential to do more harm than good. Because
Sarbanes-Oxley is more reactive than proactive, critics feel that Congress did not
fully explore the impact of the Act on, not only law-breaking corporations, but
also law-abiding corporations. 63 Critics have argued that the Act could have
been more efficient if it targeted corporations with questionable practices, rather
than arbitrarily adding more rules that impact the financial operations of every
public company.'4 In the wake of mass media attention to the major corporate
scandals of2001 and 2002, every public company must prove its integrity to the
investment and enforcement communities. 65 "The irresponsible acts of a few
have tainted the image of many to the point where guilt is now presumed over
innocence." 66
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has met extreme resistance from the law-abiding
corporate community, because full compliance has proven extremely
expensive.67 Corporate accountants and internal and independent auditors have
struggled with implementing the Act, which regulates almost every level of
accounting practice. These high costs of compliance have been extremely
burdensome on smaller companies with limited financial, structural, and
human resources. 6s
The auditing industry has undergone the most drastic change as a result of
Sarbanes-Oxley's prohibition of the provision of value-added, business
consulting services by audit firms. For example, two of the largest professional
services firms in the world, Deloitte & Touche and PriceWaterhouse were
forced to divest their consulting divisions for fear of accusations of conflicts of
interest with their audit divisions.69 However, in order to effectively audit,
auditors must analyze and evaluate its corporate customers' entire strategies and
operations. Now, independent audit firms must limit their involvement in their
customers' operations, even though consulting services would provide insight




67 Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs average $16 million per company. Jack Martin, Tightening
the Reins, WEBSPHEREJOURNAL, Jan. 4, 2005, at http//websphere.sys-con.corm/read/47651.htm.
68 MarkJaffe, Sarbanes-Oxley Exposes Missteps amid Cost Gripes (Update2), BLOOMBERG.COM, at
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=nifea&&sid=a9Ho3njHvEiA (last visited March 2, 2007).
Small companies must earn an additional $10 million in revenues per year in order to finance their
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance. Sarbanes Oxley Section 404: What is the Proper Balance Between Investor Protection
and Capital Formation for Smaller Public Companies?: Hearing on Sarbanes Oxley 404 Reliefbefore the H. Small
Business Comm., 109th Cong. 1-8, 2, (2006) (written statement by Keith Crandell, Managing Director,
AACH Venture Partners).
69 Schwartz, supra note 56.
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into customers' true financial situations. This results in a reduction in
company-specific knowledge during the audit, which will, in turn, reduce the
quality of the auditor's risk assessment. 70
In addition to its broad scope, Sarbanes-Oxley is also controversial for the
business practices that it fails to address. The legislation does not provide
guidance on how to prevent managers within public corporations from
overriding internal controls. The crucial role of the manager as an executor of
the Act highlights the importance of executive supervision and oversight. Mid-
level managers' failure to implement Sarbanes-Oxley's new controls has
resulted in additional corporate scandals at major companies, such as
HealthSouth.7' Furthermore, the enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley so far has
failed to require all CEOs and CFOs to repay bonuses, stock-option gains, and
other stock-based compensation based on false financial reports that are later
restated. This repayment should be mandatory when a corporation fails to
comply with financial reporting requirements because of any internal
misconduct.72
2. SARBANES-OXLEY DiD NOT PUT OUT THE FIRE
Sarbanes-Oxley has increased the focus upon corporate accounting
processes. However, in spite of this increased attention, questionable financial
management still occurs within this system of seemingly tight internal
controls.73 The case of Krispy Kreme, as well as those of Nortel and Fannie
Mae, illustrate that accounting scandals are still prevalent in this era ofSarbanes-
Oxley.74 Critics argue that Sarbanes-Oxley will never be enough to curb the
investing community's appetite for earnings. The pressure to "beat the Street"
has not disappeared, nor have compensation incentives, such as stock-option
plans, bonuses, and profit sharing for corporate employees. Additionally,
performance-based compensation for financial fund managers and investment
bankers and analysts fuel the desire for earnings growth.
Huge compensation packages for corporate executives have been blamed for
the prevalence of corporate accounting fraud. A large portion of executive
70 Richard H. Gifford & Harry Howe, Regulation and Unintended Consequences: Thoughts on
Sarbanes-Oxey, CPA J., June 1, 2004, at J. 6, available at http//www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumaV2004/604/
perspectives/p6.htm.
71 Boselovic, supra note 60.
72 Id.
73 Ira M. Millstein, Mastering Corporate Governance, Part 2: When Earnings Management Becomes
Cooking the Books-The Line Between Legitimate and Inappropriate Accounting Techniques Can Be a Blurry One,
but the Audit Committee Must Endeavor to Make a Clear Distinction, 1506 PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. &
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 17,23-25 (2005).
74 Id.
KRISPY KREME, SARBANES-OXLEY
compensation takes the form of stock options. Although disclosed in the
footnotes of corporate financial statements, these stock options were not
accounted for as costs and had no ultimate effect on the bottom line, unlike
other forms of employee compensation. 75 Employers became more generous
with stock options as compensation, which served only to increase the
executives' personal stakes in the employer's stock prices. This personal stake
created a strong incentive to pump up the stock price, and, in turn, for these
executives to shield bad news away from Wall Street.76 For example, under Mr.
Livengood's direction, Krispy Kreme set an objective of beating analysts'
earnings expectations by a penny a quarter, tying executive bonuses directly to
this goal.' The fact that bonuses were tied to this objective created a major
incentive for executives to hide bad news from their corporate superiors, as well
as from the investment community. Unfortunately, personal desires for higher
compensation may motivate corporate executives to ignore goodjudgment and
disclosure rules, as evidenced by Krispy Kreme.
I. A NEw RECIPE
A. The Auditors Come to the Kitchen
Because of these pressures from "the Street," auditing committees play key
roles in ensuring a safe investment environment.7" Although accounting is
considered a technical profession, corporate accountants actually have
considerable creative freedom in making discretionaryjudgments. Accounting
artistry is not limited to large financial transactions, which may attract the critical
eyes of the investment community. In very small ways, corporate accountants
decide not only if, but when, to recognize earnings, expenses, gains, and losses.
These decisions, especially when aggregated, significantly affect the financial
positions of companies, given the annual reporting approach for publicly traded
companies. Corporate accountants may rely on generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) when evaluating thesejudgment-calls; however, GAAP may
not always ensure that the true nature of a financial transaction is disclosed to
investors. Krispy Kreme's overly aggressive accounting schemes did not clearly
violate GAAP; however, its required restatements demonstrate that its
75 MARKJICKUNG, AcCOUNTING REFORM AFTER ENRON, ISSUES IN THE 108TH CONGRESS
CRS-2 (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress) (2003) (Order Code RS21530).
76 Id.
77 George Anderson, Report Issued on Krispy Kreme's Mess, RETAILWIRE.COM, Aug. 11, 2005, at
http://www.retailwire.com/Print/PrintDocument.cfm?DOC ID = 10839.
78 Millstein, supra note 73, at 24.
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accounting policies did not sufficiently disclose the true nature of its financial
transactions.
Therefore, the role of independent auditors should be to ensure that the
corporate accountants have revealed to investors the true substance of the
"deal." Sarbanes-Oxley could have achieved this result simply by requiring that
auditors certify that publicly-filed financial reports actually give "a true and fair
view of the state of affairs of the company, and that reasonable and prudent
judgments and estimates have been made, especially regarding revenue
recognition, expenses, and other items that may involve earnings
management."79 Sarbanes-Oxley should have required that independent
auditors certify quarterly reports as well as the annual reports, in order to
identify questionable practices as soon as they arise.s° If Sarbanes-Oxley had
required this certification it would have refocused the auditing process on
"quality and fairness in substance, and beyond accounting mechanics and
structure."8' Then, an independent auditor could attest, in good faith, to the
"discretionary judgments resolved in management's favour to effect a better
earnings picture both currently and looking forward, notwithstanding
compliance with GAAP."2
Under this model, the independent auditor's role would be to candidly
prepare an assessment of a company's risk management. This type of
assessment on the quality of the company's accounting principles as applied in
its financial reporting would be a stronger safeguard for investors when
compared to the current standard, which only assesses the acceptability of the
company's accounting practices.' Then, the independent auditors would be
forced to include corporate policies that promote overly aggressive accounting,
such as Krispy Kreme's, in a company's risk assessment, rather than merely
determining the policies' compliance with GAAP. IfPriceWaterhouse had used
such a standard for Krispy Kreme, it could have alerted investors to Krispy
Kreme's arguably legal, yet overly aggressive and inappropriate accounting
practices, such as the assignment of indefinite lives to its "reacquired franchise
rights," its overpayment for franchise buybacks from corporate insiders, and its
manipulation of the timing of its sales within its internal supply chain.
79 Id. at 25.
80 Todd Wenning, Steer Clear of Accounting Shenanigans, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Oct. 7, 2006, at
http/;/www.fool.com/news/commentary/2006/commentary06l007Ol .htm.




B. PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING ADDS A NEW TWIST
In addition to this new role for the corporate auditor, the policies of
corporate accounting should also be more properly aligned with representing
a "true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company,"' 4 rather than simply
following the technical rules created by GAAP. Sarbanes-Oxley is largely
focused on adding more rules to the already cumbersome GAAP handbook.
However, the legislation also calls for the SEC to investigate an alternative
accounting system, called principles-based accounting." The general idea here
is that instead of a whole handbook of technical rules, corporate accounting
should be based on a few general principles requiring "accountants to produce
a true and fair picture of the economic reality of a company's finances."8 6 The
chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) endorsed
principle-based accounting, because under the current model, "People see the
trees and not the forest."s7 However, some accounting experts fear that
principles-based accounting would merely lead to selective implementation of
financial regulations because of great confusion over the legality of various
practices.
C. Corporate Ethics-The Most Important Ingredient
1. GREED HAS A BAD AFTERTASTE
Principles-based accounting embodies the idea that GAAP and Sarbanes-
Oxley, and any other laundry list of regulations, will not completely prevent
corporate fraud. Accounting scandals do not arise solely from thwarting the
rules and regulations. Instead, they are manifestations of major human flaws:
a fascination with risk-taking and greed.' Because Congress cannot legislate
away "greed," perhaps the best approach to minimizing its effects on investors
is through the creation of a corporate asset based on ethics.
Forcing corporations to comply with general ethical standards perhaps did
not have to be implemented through a complex set of accounting regulations.
In fact, these corporate scandals may, in form, seem to be about all accounting
84 Id. at 24.
a5 Jickling, supra note 75, at 4.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Knowledge@Wharton, Corporate Fraud on Trial: What Have We Learned?, Mar. 30, 2005, at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edufindexcfm?fa=printArticle&ID= 1131.
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discrepancies, but, in substance, they are clearly all about greed.89 The fact that
the financial markets reward innovators and risk-takers creates corporate leaders
who are willing to gamble on new ideas and procedures.' Unfortunately, these
are the same leaders who may refuse to heed warning signs of the danger ahead
and may take excessive or fraudulent risks with corporate assets.9' Krispy
Kreme's post-Sarbanes-Oxley troubles reveal that the greed of numerous
players--executives, employees, investment bankers, fund managers, and
investors--outweigh any penalty of law. Legislation may not prevent unethical
conduct, and may only provide a procedure for dealing with bad behavior
within the legal system.9 Therefore, the only way to curb future corporate
scandal is to address ethics, or the lack thereof, within business professions.
One remarkable effect of Sarbanes-Oxley is the birth of the "Corporate
Ethics Industry." Immediately after the legislation passed, corporations tried to
demonstrate their commitment to ethics by hiring ethics consultants, creating
Chief Compliance Officer positions, establishing committees to handle
complaints of misconduct, and issuing corporate codes of ethics.93
Corporations hoped these efforts to create the appearance ofan ethical business
environment would persuade federal investigators and prosecutors to be more
lenient if and when any noncompliance issues arose. For example, Krispy
Kreme's website has links to its Code of Ethics for Chief Executive and Senior
Financial Officers, its Code of Business Conduct and Ethics for Members of the
Board of Directors, a charter for its internal audit committee, a General Code
of Business Conduct and Ethics, and a Corporate Governance Guideline.94
These documents cover a huge range of topics, including insider trading,
competition and fair dealing, conflicts of interest, working with a spouse, and
employees' use of the Internet.95 However, the existence of such documents at
Krispy Kreme, as well as the large rule books filled with accounting regulations,
did not give rise to an ethical organizational culture or curb the major incentive
for Krispy Kreme to satisfy Wall Street's hunger for earnings.96
Perhaps the business professionals at Krispy Kreme and other American





93 Sarbanes-Oxley requires corporations to issue codes of ethics. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, S 406, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
94 Krispy Kreme, at http://www.krispykreme.com/investorrelations.html (Click "Corporate
Governance") (last visited March 2,2007).
95 Id.
% Krispy Kreme's accounting irregularities, discussed below, demonstrate the ineffectiveness of
GAAP and Sarbanes-OxCey in combating "human greed." See Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 88.
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because they are still unclear as to its definition. Who should set the standard
for ethics in a corporate context? The government? The industry
organizations? The international governing bodies? The third-party ethics
auditors? In the United States, corporate ethics is largely an area of internal
determination, rather than federal or state regulation.97 Corporations define
their own ethical standards in line with their corporate charters, relevant
regulatory bodies, and interested investing communities. Generally,
corporations utilize two types of ethical programs: 1) code and compliance; and
2) values.98 However, neither of these programs will prove effective unless the
corporation itself ensures their enforcement. If management acts as the only
mechanisms of enforcement, then these ethics standards can be ignored as easily
as accounting standards have been in the past. Perhaps, the independent
auditors should also be responsible for ensuring compliance with internal ethical
standards as well as accounting and disclosure regulations. Alternately, perhaps
an association for business professionals, similar to The American Bar
Association for attorneys, could regulate corporate ethics with an ethical code
of conduct, a professional licensing system, and a review board for violations.99
These rules could create consistent behavior across the profession, regardless of
personal beliefs, and could also act as a guide for making difficult decisions,
especially when conflicts of interest exist. 1°° Most importantly, corporate
officers could then be responsible for ensuring compliance throughout the
management hierarchy of the organization.
2. THE CEO AND HIs SOUS-CHEFS
The saying, "The fish rots from the head," reflects that idea that unethical
corporate culture starts with a company's top executives.' 01 An effective CEO
possesses the ability to set a tone of ethical conduct that can saturate a corporate
97 Malte Sussdorff, Adding Corporate Ethics to the Bottom Line, CSREUROPE.ORG, Nov. 9,2000, at
http://intranet.csreurope.org/news/csr/one-entty?entryid= 114283.
98 Id.
99 Scott Harshbarger & Robert Stringer, Creating a Climate of Corporate Integrity, THE CORP.
BOARD, May-June 2005, at 10, 12.
100 Id.
101 An infamous example of corrupt corporate executives creating a corrupt corporate culture is
Crazy Eddie, the now-defunct electronics retailer. Crazy Eddie was involved in combinations of white-
collar crimes and financial fraud. Sam Antar, the former CFO, stated that he and the former top
executives committed these crimes, because morality was never an issue for their corporation. "We never
had one conversation about morality during the 18 years that the fraud was going on." Herb Greenberg,
Making a Strong Case for Sarbanes-Oxley---A Former Crook Argues Against Watering Down Securities Law,
MARKETWATCH.COM, Oct. 11, 2006, at http://www.marketwatch.com (enter search for "Greenberg
Sarbanes-Oxley"; then follow "Herb Greenberg: A reformed crook's view ofSarbanes-Oxley" hyperlink).
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culture.'02 An ethical corporate culture is created "when values that transcend
narrow self-interest are built into the practice and structure of the enterprise."'°3
A CEO's integrity has become increasingly important in determining corporate
culture as a direct result of the recent exposure of the misbehavior and excesses
of a few CEOs of major corporations, including Krispy Kreme's Livengood.'
4
Ifa CEO continually focuses on corporate integrity and frequently assesses
the existing integrity systems within its management hierarchy, the entire
corporation's culture can slowly move toward a strong ethical focus.' 5
Promoting this type of corporate environment could be more effective than the
imposition of legal penalties, because it could deter unethical conduct before it
even takes place, rather than punishing it after the damage has already been
done."l
Because most current and future business executives will be educated in
business schools, recruitment of educational institutions is essential in order to
convince these future leaders that ethics are a critical factor for financial
success.' '7 If business schools start teaching "ethics as a corporate asset,"
business leaders will start to include ethics into corporate profiles.' Executives
can reinforce this concept through internal ethics education programs.' 9 Such
educational programs should not only focus on management, but should also
involve every level of employee in the protection of an ethical corporate
culture."' Ethics can also be reinforced throughout a corporate hierarchy
through compensation and rewards programs. Compensation and reward
programs need to be carefully structured and monitored, to make sure that
managers do not focus solely upon "making their numbers" when faced with
business conflicts."' If ethical decision-making is a part of every employee's
102 Peter Koestenbaum, Patrick J. Keys, & Thomas R. Weirich, Integrating Sarbanes-Oxley,
Leadership, and Ethics, THE CPAJouRNAL, Apr. 2005, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/
405/perspectives/p13.htm.
103 Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE
NEWCORPORATEACCOUNTABLrrY: CORPORATE SocIAL RESPONSIBILITYAND THE LAW(D. McBarnett
et al. eds., Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming).
104 Harshbarger, supra note 99, at 12.
105 Id.
106 Koestenbaum, supra note 102.
107 See id.
108 See id.; Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 88.
109 See generally Sussdorff, supra note 97.
110 The U.S. Sentencing Commission ruled that the lack of an internal ethics education program
could be a factor that weighed against a corporation whose employees had been found guilty of fraudulent
activities. Greg Farrell &Jayne O'Donnell, Ethics Training As Taught By Ex-Cons: Crime Doesn't Pay, USA
TODAY, Nov. 16,2005, available at httpV/www.paradigmshiftpr.con/ethicstraining.htm.
MI Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 88.
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performance review, then ethics will become an integral part of every
employee's career advancement and personal bottom line.
3. ETHIcs-TAsTEs So GOOD
"Ethics as a corporate asset" can become truly valuable-more than a
clich6-if corporations use their own ethical standards as a way to differentiate
themselves from other publicly-traded companies as the "right" investment
choice. 112 By highlighting not only its capacity to produce a high return, but also
its commitment to the social contract between business and society, a
corporation can ease apprehensive investors' worries about another Enron-like
scandal and the resulting financial downfall. 113 However, investors also demand
credibility as their skepticism of public relations and advertising increases;
therefore, "ethics as a corporate asset" cannot serve asjust a promotional tool,
as it was for Livengood at Krispy Kreme in 2002.114 Investors expect to see some
proof of ethics in action-starting with the major business leaders. "
Additionally, "ethics as a corporate asset" can be economically valuable, because
it can help to prevent decreases in either brand equity and reputation or other
sources of competitive advantage during periods of extreme investor
skepticism." 6 Clearly, "ethics" should be more thanjust a buzzword after the
tangible and devastating financial losses at Krispy Kreme.
However, the fact that each day new corporate scandals are headlined in the
news illustrates that "ethics as a corporate asset" has not yet been embraced by
business professionals. A 2005 survey of members of the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners revealed that only 17% of members feel that there
will be a permanent shift among business professionals toward fraud prevention
and corporate integrity in the foreseeable future, 39% feel that interest in
corporate ethics will fade within the next five years, 32% feel that this interest
has already begun to fade, and 12% feel that there has been no change at all
among business leaders." 7 An even less fortunate statistic is that 67% feel that
institutional fraud is more commonplace today than it was five years ago. 18
These fraud examiners agreed that Sarbanes-Oxley has helped corporations and
investors identify weaknesses within internal control systems; however, they are
112 Sussdorff, supra note 97.
113 See generally, id.
114 See id.; Global Province, supra note 21.
115 See id.
116 Harshbarger, supra note 99, at 16.
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promoting alternative methods, such as ethics training, shareholder derivative
suits and criminal penalties for controlling fraud and enhancing compliance. 19
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the accounting regulations contained in Sarbanes-Oxley are not
the final solutions for the lack of ethical behavior in business, the legislation
does set up the framework for compliance and the legal penalties for
noncompliance. However, Krispy Kreme and its fraudulent corporate
colleagues have proven that compliance with a set of accounting rules, like
GAAP and Sarbanes-Oxley, may not reveal a fair state of affairs of a corporation.
Additionally, executives who are devoid of any moral compass will always look
for loopholes in the legislation."n Sarbanes-Oxley may help investors identify
fraudulent accounting practices, but, alone, it is not enough to combat corporate
greed. Therefore, the best approach to actuallypreventing accounting and other
types of fraud is by incorporating ethics into Corporate America's bottom line.
119 Id.
120 See id.
